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meet the requirements, of course only the future will tell. Appar-
ently an attempt has been made to steer a middle course between
those advocated by persons urging distinctly socialistic measures, and
the attitude of the trusting conservatives who contend that if the
guaranty companies had been left alone they would have been able
to work out their own salvation with a minimum of loss to investors.
In any event, the measures taken are both comprehensive and de-
tailed.42  Whether the creation of a mortgage authority or commis-
sion, as advocated during the past year, would prove more efficacious
is now a dead issue, such measures having been defeated by the
legislature. 48 Instead, it has seen fit to place the power and respon-
sibility in the hands of the Superintendent of Insurance, subject to
the supervision of the courts, and on his ability and integrity in the
last analysis the final outcome of the situation depends.
4 4
WESLEY DAVrS.
TESTIMONY OF ATTORNEY IN PROBATE OF WILL.-Exclusion of
an attorney's testimony as to the circumstances surrounding the exe-
cution of his client's will proceeded from the intention of the courts
to promote freedom of consultation for those who sought legal
advice.' The conditions in which the rule had its genesis were dis-
cussed by the court in Rochester City Bank v. Suydam.2  It was
without regard to the restrictions as to whether or not the security constitutes
a legal investment. Laws of 1934, c. 914. In addition, the Civil Practice Act
now provides that the court may direct a receiver of rents appointed in a
foreclosure action to apply the net rental received by him towards the payment
of accrued interest on the mortgage. N. Y. CIVIL PRACTICE ACT §977-a, added
by Laws of 1934, c. 911.
"Not mentioned hereinbefore, and typical of the details which have been
considered and enacted into law, are the tax exemptions granted relative to the
reorganization of the properties. Mortgages made by corporations formed
pursuant to Real Property Law §121 or Insurance Law, art 12, as well as
mortgages made to the Home Owners Loan Corporation, are exempt from the
taxes imposed by art. 11 of the Tax Law. N. Y. TAX LAW §252-a, added by
Laws of 1933, c. 311, as amended by Laws of 1934, c. 910; N. Y. TAX LAW
§252, as amended by Laws of 1933, c. 785 and Laws of 1934, c. 455. Corpo-
rations formed for reorganization purposes under the Schackno Act are
exempted from corporate taxes imposed by Tax Law §180. N. Y. TAX LAW
§180, subd. 1-a, added by Laws of 1934, c. 454.
" Second Extraordinary Session, Senate Bill No. 11, Introductory No. 9;
July 13, 1934; Second Extraordinary Session, Senate Bill Nos. 81, 120, 149,
Introductory No. 70, Aug. 1, 1934.
"It is, of course, entirely possible that the next session of the Legislature
will see a complete revamping of these laws and perhaps wholesale substitution
of new measures. Most of the legislators-elect stated during the campaign
that they favored "relief for mortgage certificate holders," whatever that may
mean. Citizens Union Voters Directory, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, Oct., 1934.
' 2 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE (16th ed. 1899) §243.
2 5 How. Pr. 254 (N. Y. 1851).
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there said that in the early days when litigants conducted the prosecu-
tion and defense of their own causes, they could not, in the course
of trial, be compelled to disclose facts exclusively within their own
knowledge. When the conduct of suits became more complex and
it was found necessary that lawyers transact the business of the
courts, suitors entrusted them with such facts as were relevant to
the case but within their own knowledge. "If the facts they com-
municated were liable to be extorted from the attorney or counsel,
suitors would hesitate to employ them, to the great inconvenience of
the court, and obstruction of judicial business." 3
During his lifetime it is unquestionably the testator's desire
that the contents, and perhaps the existence, of his will be kept
secret. But it is also indisputable that he knows full well that its
probate will be attended with some publicity and that both the will
and the proceedings are destined to be matters of public record. It
should follow that after his death his attorney should be permitted
to disclose the circumstances affecting its execution and purpose.
Such, indeed, was the rule at common law, if the purpose of the
attorney's testimony was in support of the will.4  No evidence
tending to defeat the will, however, as lack of testamentary capacity
or undue influence was admissible.5 In Massachusetts this still
appears to be the rule.0 The Supreme Court of the United States
has also retained the doctrine, holding that the testimony of the
attorney who drew the will was admissible to prove the legitimacy
of the testator's children. The court said, "How can it be said to
be for his (the testator's) interest to exclude any testimony in sup-
port of what he solemnly proclaimed and put on record as his will ?" 7
The adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1877 containing
Sections 835 and 836 (now Sections 353 and 354 of the Civil Prac-
tice Act) was considered merely a codification of the common law
principle.8 The statute prohibited the disclosure of any communi-
cation made by a client to his attorney in the course of his profes-
sional employment,9 but permitted the client to waive the privilege
under prescribed conditions.? In 1888 the Court of Appeals decided
that an attorney who witnessed a will and signed the attestation clause
should be permitted to testify as to circumstances attending its execu-
tion.'1 The court based its ruling upon the theory that the testator
'Id. at 256.
'Sanford v Sanford, 61 Barb. 293 (N. Y. 1872).
'Sheridan v. Houghton, 16 Hun 628, aff'd, 84 N. Y. 643 (1879).
'Dougherty v. O'Callaghan, 157 Mass. 90, 31 N. E. 726 (1892).
'Blackburn v. Crawfords, 70 U. S. 175, citing with approval the English
case of Russel v. Jackson, 9 Hare 387 (Ch. 1851). But see Bullivant v.
Attorney General for Victoria, (1901) A. C. 196, 206.
aMatter of King v. Ashley, 179 N. Y. 281, 72 N. E. 106 (1904) ; Hurlburt
v. Hurlburt, 128 N. Y. 420, 28 N. E. 651 (1891).
9§835.
0 §836.
'Matter of Coleman, 111 N. Y. 220, 19 N. E. 71.
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had waived the privilege when he requested the attorney to sign.
"He must have been aware that his object in making a will might
prove ineffectual unless these witnesses could be called to testify to
the circumstances attending its execution." 12 Professor Wigmore
declares that this conclusion is not in harmony with the theory of
waiver but rather with the view that the evidence was not intended
to be privileged. "When the attorney is made a witness to attest
execution of a document (and not merely to draft it) there is no con-
fidence contemplated, and therefore no privilege for the occasion when
the attorney is called upon to fulfill the function thereby assumed.
He cannot be an attesting witness and yet not attest: * * *." 13 In
accordance with this the legislature amended Section 896 in 1893
by inserting the sentence, "But nothing herein contained shall be
construed to disqualify an attorney in the probate of a will heretofore
executed or offered for probate or hereafter to be executed or offered
for probate from becoming a witness, as to its preparation or execu-
tion in case such attorney is one of the subscribing witnesses there-
to." 14 This was nothing more than a restatement of the rule pro-
nounced in the Coleman case 15 with the endorsement of legislative
approval.
The courts have continued since to affirm the general rule thus
provided, excluding the testimony of the attorney who drew the will
unless he was a subscribing witness.16 The amendment to Section
354 of the Civil Practice Act (enacted during the current year) 17
admitting such evidence is the first assault upon the citadel of the
privilege since the adoption of the Cqde of Civil Procedure in 1876;
because as we have already seen, the testimony of the subscribing
witness cannot be regarded as privileged. Section 354 now reads as
follows regarding this point: "But nothing contained in this sec-
tion or in section 353 shall be construed to disqualify an attorney, or
his employees, in the probate of a will heretofore executed or offered
for probate or hereafter to be executed or offered for probate from
becoming a witness, as to its preparation or execution whether such
an attorney is or is not one of the subscribing witnesses thereto. But
such attorney or his employees, upon a trial or examination, shall
not be permitted to disclose any confidential communications which
would tend to disgrace the memory of the decedent."
12 Id. at 226.
"4 WIGMORF, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §2315.
"N. Y. Laws 1893, c. 295.
Supra note 11.
"Matter of Cunnion, 201 N. Y. 123, 94 N. E. 648 (1911) ; It re Williams'
Will, 121 Misc. 243, 201 N. Y. Supp. 205 (1923); In re Carter's Will, 122
Misc. 493, 204 N. Y. Supp. 393 (1924); Matter of Eno, 196 App. Div. 131,
187 N. Y. Supp. 756 (1st Dept. 1921); In re Putnam's Will, 257 N. Y. 140,
177 N. E. 399 (1931).
:' N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 305.
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Since the New York courts do not "strain for probate" 18 the
new rule will prove a welcome aid in expediting will contests here.
The old formula has been severely criticized as having no basis in
logic.19 A testator who is insane or unduly influenced is necessarily
unaware of either disability. It is imposing a great strain upon the
language to say that he "communicates" the "fact" of such incom-
petency to his attorney, since he neither knows of its existence nor
communicates it in confidence. Nor can it seriously be argued that
the testator intends that facts which will clarify the meaning of his
will should be kept secret. His very purpose in seeking the services
of a lawyer is that his will be so drawn that his wishes cannot be
disputed after his death. The conclusion is inescapable, also, that
knowing that probate is impossible without due execution, he cannot
wish the facts surrounding this act to remain undisclosed.20 It ap-
pears not quite reasonable that his attorney's testimony should ever
have been excluded.
LEON BRAUN.
POWER OF THE SURROGATE TO VACATE ORDER OF ADOPTION.-
The legislature has belatedly recognized the inconvenience attending
the restraint, by judicial rulings, placed upon the surrogate's powers
denying him authority to vacate an order of adoption issued out of
his court. An amendment to Section 113 of the Domestic Relations
Law now specifically provides that "The Surrogate may open, vacate or
set aside, an order of adoption for fraud, newly discovered evidence,
or other sufficient cause, in like manner, as a court of record and of
general jurisdiction exercises the same powers." I This legislation
was found necessary in spite of the broad powers given the surrogate
by subdivision 6 of Section 20, of the Surrogate's Court Act,2 which
permits him to "open, vacate, modify or set aside, or to enter as of a
former time, a decree or order of his court." The former rule,
forbidding the vacating of an order of adoption, or the setting aside
of a consent to an abrogation of adoption, resulted from the Appel-
late Division's view that an adoption proceeding was administrative
rather than judicial. "In both cases he (the surrogate), representing
the public interests in domestic relations, is approving a contract,
and his approval gives it the prescribed statutory effect, in the one
I' Taft, Comnents on Will Contests in New York (1921) 30 YALE L. J.
593, 606.
" Cf. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §2314.
Ibid.
1 Laws of 1934, c. 368, N. Y. DOMESTIC RELATIONs LAW, art. 7, §113,
effective Sept. 1, 1934.
' Laws of 1920, c. 928, derived from §2481, N. Y. CODE OF CIvIL PROCEDURE.
